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Abstract  
Multiattribute auctions, which allow bids on multiple dimensions of the product, are IT-enabled 
sourcing mechanisms that increase the efficiency of procurement for configurable goods and 
services compared to price-only auctions. Given the strategic nature of procurement auctions, the 
amount of information concerning the buyer’s preferences that is disclosed to the suppliers has 
implications on the profits of the buyer and suppliers and, consequently, on the long-term 
relationship between them.  This study develops novel feedback schemes for multiattribute 
auctions that protect buyer’s preference information from the supplier and suppliers’ cost 
schedule from the buyer.  We conduct a laboratory experiment to study bidder behavior and profit 
implications under three different feedback regimes.  Our results indicate that bidders are able to 
extract more profit with more information regarding the state of the auction in terms of 
provisional allocation and prices.  Furthermore, bidding behavior is substantially influenced by 
the nature and type of feedback. 
Keywords: Procurement auctions, multiattribute auctions, information feedback, bidder behavior, 
experimental economics. 
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Résumé 
Cette étude développe de nouveaux systèmes de rétroaction pour des enchères multi-attributs qui assurent à 
l’acquéreur la confidentialité de l’information sur ses préférences et qui garantissent à l’offreur la confidentialité de 
l’information sur ses coûts. Une expérimentation est menée pour étudier le comportement et les gains de l’offreur 
dans le cadre de trois types différents de rétroaction. 
 
Introduction 
Industrial procurement is an important part of the supplier selection problem, which is concerned with the selection 
of vendors followed by the determination of the nature of contracts with them.  With the rapid advances in 
information technology (IT), auctions are being increasingly used for the procurement of goods and services.  
Procurement auctions enable multiple suppliers of goods and services to competitively bid for the business of a 
single customer or buyer.  The process involves identifying, evaluating, negotiating, and configuring optimal sets of 
suppliers’ bids, which are usually received in response to the procuring firm’s request for quote (RFQ).  The 
objective is primarily to minimize the total procurement cost subject to various business constraints.  The 
complexity of the process depends on the quantity of items procured, number of participating suppliers, and also the 
business constraints associated with it.   
Corporate procurements often require a supplier to fulfill several required characteristics of a contract – both 
qualitative and quantitative – in addition to price.  However, conventional auction mechanisms restrict the 
negotiations solely to price while keeping other elements of the contract fixed.  Therefore, these auctions are not 
well suited for procurement problems where commodities require detailed technical specifications, because they 
compel buyers to commit to specific configurations of the product in advance.  Ideally, buyers would like to 
negotiate all the dimensions of the contract simultaneously with all potential suppliers in order to create the best 
purchase agreement.  With the flexibility afforded by the Internet and the computational power of new technologies, 
it is possible to design advanced mechanisms that take into account multiple facets of the contract and not just price. 
Multiattribute auctions
1 represent such a mechanism, which extends the traditional auction setting by allowing bids 
over price as well as non-price attributes.  In a procurement problem, a multiattribute auction can allow different 
suppliers to compete over qualitative attributes, such as supplier reputation, terms of warranty, and lead time, in 
addition to price.  These auctions provide buyers the ability to negotiate over a multidimensional space of product 
characteristics.  Prior research has shown that, multiattribute auctions can achieve higher market efficiency through 
better information exchange of buyer’s preferences and suppliers’ capabilities, compared to price-only auctions 
(Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005).  Other expected gains include faster negotiation and higher market transparency.  Many 
software vendors and procurement departments now support multiattribute reverse2 auctions in their e-sourcing 
solutions.  Such firms include Ariba, freemarkets, Procuri, and i2 technologies (Minahan et al. 2002). 
While multiattribute auctions allow suppliers to better express their production capabilities, they also present a 
complex bidding environment where bidders have to solve difficult optimization problems to prepare efficient 
multidimensional bids.  Therefore, in order to ensure that the environment is sufficiently easy to use for bidders, it is 
necessary to design appropriate feedback mechanisms that can assist bidders in preparing their bids.   However, 
considering that procurement is a key source of strategic advantage for many organizations, the amount of 
information the buyer should disclose or try to elicit from the supplier is a critical and sensitive issue.  A buyer may 
not want to reveal her complete preferences in order to foster more competition and drive down price while a 
supplier may not want to disclose his production schedule in order to maximize his profits.  While a less transparent 
mechanism may benefit a buyer, it may also alienate prospective suppliers. 
Thus, companies such as Ariba suggest that buyers employ a variety of information disclosure schemes for 
traditional procurement auctions based on the specific negotiation requirements and on the structure of the market 
for the commodity being procured.  For example, if the auction is for a commodity that has few suppliers and is of 
                                                           
1 These have been variously referred to as multidimensional (Che 1993; Koppius et al. 2000), multiissue (Teich et al. 1999), and 
multicriteria (De Smet 2007) auctions in the literature. 
2 In reverse auctions, a buyer solicits bids from a group of potential sellers. 
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high strategic importance, then Ariba suggests using sealed-bid auctions, i.e., an auction format with no intermediate 
information revelation.  On the other hand, if the auction is for a commodity with a large number of suppliers and of 
little strategic importance, then Ariba suggests using more transparent auctions, such as English and Dutch auctions.   
In many other cases, Ariba provides a variety of mechanisms with different restrictive feedback schemes that are 
somewhere between completely sealed and completely transparent3. 
In order to facilitate the use of multiattribute auctions for automated strategic sourcing processes, we have designed 
multi-level feedback schemes intended to foster competition and make the environment transparent while also 
protecting buyer’s preferences and suppliers’ cost schedule.  The schemes consist of information regarding 
provisional allocation that can potentially make bidders better aware of the auction state, and price signals that are 
expected to assist bidders in revising their bids.  Of interest is how each of these feedback schemes affects bidder 
behavior and the distribution of the economic surplus among the buyers and the suppliers.  To study bidder 
behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment, wherein subjects participate in hypothetical multiattribute 
procurement auctions.  We find that the nature of feedback can significantly influence bidder behavior as well as the 
distribution of gains between the buyer and the suppliers.  Our results indicate that, even with similar allocative 
efficiency, the buyer can control the extent of information disclosure to achieve specific auction objectives. 
Literature Review 
Procurement auctions come in a variety of forms depending on the structure of the market and the needs of the 
buyer.  Elmaghraby (2000) provides a survey of the existing research on procurement auctions in the areas of 
economics and operations research, especially the research on the choice of a specific sourcing strategy.   
Multiattribute auctions are of special importance to procurement contexts since buyers are almost always interested 
in not just price but other aspects of the contract such as quality and delivery time. 
Multiattribute auctions as models for procurement were first studied by Che (1993).  He studied an auction protocol 
in which the negotiation was based on price as well as quality in a sealed-bid setting.  He assumed that each seller 
was characterized by only one private cost parameter, which the buyer was assumed to know.  Branco (1997) 
extended this model by introducing cost correlation among bidding firms.  Furthermore, he used a two-stage auction, 
in which the procurer selected a firm in the first stage and then negotiated to readjust the quality level in the second.  
Both Che and Branco assumed that the buyer has perfect knowledge of the bidders’ cost structures.  However, our 
objective is to conduct auctions, where suppliers do not have to disclose their cost schedule to the buyer.  
An approach often taken to evaluate multidimensional bids is to assign weights to the relevant attributes to compute 
a value score for the buyer4.  The score is expected to reflect the utility derived by the buyer from the bid.  Bidders 
can then compete to improve this score by modifying one or more of the bid-attributes.  This approach is used by 
software vendors such as Epicor, IBM, Moai Technologies (Bichler and Kalagnanam 2005), by US highway 
procurement authorities (Herbsman et al. 1995), and in the auctions for electricity reserve supply (Wilson 2002).  
Asker and Cantillon (2008) show that scoring auctions dominate several other procedures (e.g., menu auctions5, 
beauty contests6, and price-only auctions) for buying differentiated products.  We use such a scoring rule approach 
in our design of multiattrbute auctions.  Bichler et al. (1999) used a utility-function approach to study some internet-
based implementations of multiattribute procurement auctions.  They outlined some theoretical questions associated 
with multiattribute auctions and also described an implementation of the mechanism.  Beil and Wein (2003) 
considered iterative multiattribute auctions where the buyer changed his scoring rule during the auction based on 
bids in the previous rounds.  However, in this paper we consider multiattribute auctions that are based on an explicit 
model of buyer’s preferences. 
                                                           
3 Jason Solinger, “ARIBA Spend Management,” Presentation at University of Minnesota, Nov. 19, 2007. 
4 Multiple Attribute Utility (MAU) theory addresses the issue of converting multiple performance measures to a scalar 
performance metric.  For a thorough review of MAU, see Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Winterfeld and Edwards (1986). 
5 In a menu auction, the suppliers submit menus of price and non-price attributes from which the buyer chooses the combination 
that best suits her needs. 
6 In a beauty contest, the buyer tells the suppliers that she cares about other attributes of the product in addition to its price but 
accepts a single bid from them, and chooses the bid he prefers from the received bids. 
Economics of Information Systems 
4 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008  
Bichler (2000) compared the efficiencies of multiattribute and price-only auctions through laboratory experiments 
and he found no significant difference.  Strecker (2003) conducted two sets of English auction experiments with two 
qualitative attributes, where the buyer’s scoring function was fully revealed in one of the auctions and not revealed 
at all in the other.  He found full revelation to increase both allocative and Pareto efficiency of the auction.  
Similarly, in several experimental studies, Koppius and van Heck (2003) found that revealing more information 
about buyer’s preferences improved the auction performance in terms of Pareto efficiency.  However, according to 
Pinker et al. (2003), these results may not be practical, given that most firms seek to maximize their own utility 
rather than achieve economic efficiency for a market, and given that firms may also be reluctant to directly reveal 
their utility functions to competitors. 
Therefore, with more practical auctions in mind, we study cases where the buyer does not reveal her entire scoring 
function but provides several other pieces of information that would help the bidders in their bid formulation.  The 
impact of this kind of feedback has recently been experimentally studied by Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005).  They found 
their restrictive feedback mechanism to increase both buyer utility and supplier profits compared to price-only 
mechanisms.  However, the procurement auctions that they conduct are sole-sourcing, i.e., the contracts are awarded 
to a single supplier.  Such restrictions are appropriate for goods with high asset-specificity (e.g., weapons systems 
procured by Department of Defense) and were imposed in early evaluations of multiattribute auctions for alleviating 
computational complexities.  But with the increasing use of mutiattribute auctions for less specific assets (e.g., MRO 
procurement), multiple sourcing becomes more important (Bichler and Kalagnanam 2005).  Furthermore, with the 
rapid advancements in IT, it is now feasible to conduct these auctions in real-time.  In this paper, we evaluate several 
feedback schemes for multiple sourcing scenarios.  We consider a situation where a buyer requires several units of 
an asset that she is willing to purchase from multiple suppliers.   
Laboratory data forms an important means of analyzing and comparing complex auction mechanisms.  It allows us 
to calculate performance measures under controlled conditions that are impossible in field studies.  Numerous 
studies have shown that, even in simple price-only auctions, bidders behave differently from what the theory 
predicts (Coppinger et al. 1980; Holt 2007; Kagel et al. 1987).  Thus, laboratory environments have been widely 
used as testbeds for auction designs, especially for complex mechanisms, such as multiunit auctions (Bapna et al. 
2001), combinatorial auctions (Adomavicius et al. 2007; Banks et al. 1989; Kwasnica et al. 2005), and multiattribute 
auctions (Bichler 2000; Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005; Koppius and van Heck 2003; Strecker 2003).   
In order to evaluate the effects of varying quality and quantity of feedback on bidder behavior in mutiattribute 
auctions, we conduct a laboratory experiment, where subjects play the role of suppliers competing to sell several 
units of an asset to a buyer.   The buyer is designed as an automated agent, who evaluates bids based on a predefined 
utility function.  Although we do not reveal this utility function to the suppliers because of the strategic reasons 
described earlier, we provide novel price signals to the bidders to help them revise their bids.  In the next section, we 
describe our design of the multiattribute auction environment that allows us to conduct such auctions in the 
laboratory. 
Multiattribute Auction Design 
We simulate a multiattribute bidding scenario with m suppliers, a single buyer, and k identical units of a commodity, 
each defined by a quality attribute q in addition to its unit price p.  The quality attribute has several discrete abstract 
levels, denoted by q∈Q = {0.00, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 1.00}.  Our rationale for using an abstract range for quality is the 
observation that, in industrial procurement, companies usually specify an acceptable range of the quality of a 
product.  For example, a company procuring floppy disks can specify that the acceptable range of the space between 
the read/write head and the disk is between 0.0 and 0.2 microns.  In that case, quality level 0.01 can represent the 
maximum tolerance and quality level 1.00 the optimal space.    
The buyer requires multiple units of the commodity, which she can choose to source from any number of suppliers 
(multiple sourcing); quantity n ∈ N = {1, …, k} is also negotiable along with the price and quality.  In other words, 
bid b consists of a specification of quality level, price, and quantity; i.e., b = (p, q, n).   
We use a standard (see for example, Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005) non-linear valuation function for the buyer that 
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monotonically increases in quality.  This function is given by 00( )v q A q
α
= , where 0 0A >  and 00 1α≤ ≤  are 
quality-related constants for the buyer.  We assume that the buyer prefers higher quality product (other things being 
equal) with a decreasing marginal value.  The utility function of the buyer is derived from the valuation function by 
subtracting the weighted price of the commodity.  The utility of a bid non-linearly increases with quantity because 
typically a buyer prefers to buy as many units from a supplier as possible in order to minimize the transaction cost of 
procurement.  The utility function is thus:  
( )00( , , )U p q n A q Bp Cnα β γ= − , 
where B > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 are price-related constants, and C > 0 and γ  ≥  1 (since the marginal value of quantity is 
increasing) are quantity-related constants.  The utility function translates the values of the attributes into a utility 
score, which can be used by the buyer to compare bids that are vectors of the three relevant attributes (i.e., quality, 
quantity, and price).  The objective of the buyer is to maximize her total utility from the trade.    
Each supplier’s production function is also a standard non-linear function, monotonically increasing in quality.  We 
model the cost function as 11( )
i
i ic q A q
α
= , where A1i > 0 and α1i > 1 are quality-related constants for the i
th supplier.  
Each supplier is technologically equipped to produce any quality level from set Q.  Since higher quality product 
requires higher effort and resources, the maximal quantity of production is dependent on the quality of the produced 
goods according to the production function: 22( )
i
i in q D A q
α
= − , where A2i > 0 and α2i > 1 are quality-related 
constants for the supplier and D > 0 is a threshold stipulating the maximum units of the commodity technologically 
possible to produce.  The profit function of the suppliers who are awarded a contract is given by  
( ) ( )11( , , ) ( ) ii i ip q n p c q n p A q nαπ = − = − , 
where 0 ( )in n q≤ ≤ .  
We allow partial fulfillment by assuming the submitted bids to be divisible. This means that the suppliers can offer 
to supply any number of units, but the buyer makes her decision about the number of units to procure from each of 
the winning sellers in such a way that maximizes her total utility.  We assume that the suppliers will be ready to 
supply a partial order at the same unit price that they have quoted in their winning bids.  This assumption allows us 
to compare bids by simply calculating the per-unit utility of each bid7.  Each supplier can have at most one bid 
accepted; it is the one that generates the highest per-unit utility for the buyer.  We call this bid the best bid of the 
bidder.  Although the buyer’s goal is to maximize her total utility, under the assumption of bid divisibility, the buyer 
can select individual bids simply on the basis of the per-unit utility generated by the bid.  
The outcome of the auction consists of a list of winning suppliers along with the final quality level, the final price 
that each of them quoted, and the number of units of commodity the buyer decides to procure from each of the 
winners.  We use a first-score rule (analogous to first-price auctions for price-only cases) for winner determination, 
wherein the winner has to match the exact quality and price listed in his winning bid.  This is also referred to as a 
discriminatory scoring rule since all the winning suppliers do not supply at the same price or quality.  Although this 
implies that the buyer may procure the same item with different quality from multiple suppliers, this will not cause a 
problem since, as mentioned earlier, the range of the quality levels can be set to the accepted tolerance for the 
product. 
Feedback Design 
We have developed four feedback schemes that are intended to assist bidders in understanding the state of the 
auction and in making efficient bids, without revealing the buyer’s utility function to the supplier or the supplier’s 
cost schedule to the buyer.  Our primary objective is to design assistive information that does not require the buyer 
or the suppliers to exchange each others’ profitability information.  Our restrictive information feedback schemes 
provide provisional allocation information as well as price and quality signals to the bidders.   Each of these 
feedback schemes is described below: 
                                                          
7 Without this assumption, winner determination would entail solving a combinatorial problem. 
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(i) Allocation Signal. These feedback schemes are designed to provide indications to the suppliers 
regarding provisional allocations. 
a. Rank refers to the relative ranking of the bid among all the bids received, in terms of buyer’s 
utility.  All the best bids are sorted in terms of the per-unit utility derived by the buyer from the 
bid.  This sorted list is then ranked with the bid generating the highest per-unit utility for the buyer 
having rank 1. The provisional rank of each bidder is disclosed to that bidder at every stage of the 
auction.  Whenever there is a new best bid, the ranks are updated.  Multiple bidders can have the 
same rank if the unit utility scores of their best bid happen to be the same, in which case the 
remaining requirement is split among them.   
b. Status is a Boolean variable that indicates to the bidder whether his bid is currently (provisionally) 
in the winning set.  Since we are considering more practical multiple sourcing scenarios, even the 
bidders ranked second or lower can win a portion of the order if the highest ranked supplier is 
unable to fulfill the entire order. 
(ii) Marginal Utility Signal. These feedback schemes are expected to assist the bidders in formulating 
optimal bids without explicitly announcing the buyer’s utility function.  This consists of 
vectors of marginal values for the quality and price attributes that will be provided to the 
suppliers in order to help them optimally improve their rank at any given state of the auction if 
they chose to.  This feedback will be provided to all suppliers who are not ranked first. 
a. Price Update is a vector of possible prices to achieve each rank that is above the bidder’s current 
rank, where quality and quantity levels remain the same as in the existing best bid of the supplier.   
b. Quality Update is a vector of possible quality levels to achieve each rank that is above the bidder’s 
current rank, where price and quantity levels remain the existing best bid of the supplier.   
These vectors would be tailored to the bid specifications of each supplier.  Each supplier can weigh 
these two pieces of information against his own profit function and revise his bid accordingly so as to 
extract maximum profit.  Note that sometimes the suggested quality level or price may not be 
achievable, e.g., if the suggested ask price for a given quality is below the bidder’s cost.  In such cases 
the bidders must use their own judgment to revise price as well as quality in order to place the most 
profitable bid. 
For the purpose of our empirical investigation concerning the impact of these feedback schemes on the dynamics 
and outcome of the auctions, we arrange the feedback schemes into three progressively advanced feedback levels.  
These are: 
• Level 1 - RANK. In this level, only Rank feedback is provided. 
• Level 2 - UTILITY. In this level, Rank, Price Update, and Quality Update are provided. 
• Level 3 - STATUS. In this level, Rank, Price Update, Quality Update, and Status are provided. 
The levels are named after the additional feedback that is provided at that level.  Each of these feedback levels is 
expected to serve a specific purpose as described below.   
The rank of the bidders has been used as a feedback scheme in previous research as well (Koppius and van Heck 
2003).  We use this feedback level as a baseline.  While the RANK feedback provides information regarding 
provisional allocation, it does not inform the bidders whether, at a given rank, they are included in the winning set or 
not.  Furthermore, if the bidders believe that they are not included in the winning set, they do not have precise 
information regarding the minimum revision that they need to make to be included in the provisional allocation.  
The UTILITY feedback is expected to serve this purpose.   Simply providing allocation feedback is generally 
insufficient for decision makers to make myopically optimal decisions (Brehmer 1980), since the feedback lacks 
strategic information regarding the marginal improvement to the bid that is required.  The UTILIY feedback 
condition provides a higher level of cognitive feedback, offering task-related information, which has been shown to 
be effective in learning tasks (Balzer et al. 1989) and is expected to lead towards improving individual’s economic 
performance.  Therefore, we expect that bidders will be able to gain higher profits with the UTILITY feedback as 
compared to the RANK feedback.  However, even with the UTILITY feedback, suppliers do not have the 
information as to whether they are winning at a certain rank.  Without this critical piece of information, suppliers 
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may end up undercutting their profit in an attempt to achieve a higher rank.  Since in Level 3 this crucial feedback is 
available to the bidders, the STATUS feedback can be expected to lead to higher bidder profits compared to the 
other two cases.  However, at the same time, more transparency may also lead to more competitive bidding, 
resulting in lower profits for the suppliers.  Note that, these three feedback levels are not the only possible 
combinations of the feedback schemes that we have designed.  However, each of them addresses a specific problem 
that bidders face while composing and revising multidimensional bids. 
Performance Measures 
The auction literature on multiattrbute auctions provides a variety of criteria and measures to evaluate the 
performance of procurement auctions (Beil and Wein 2003; Bichler 2000; Bichler and Kalagnanam 2005; Chen-
Ritzo et al. 2005; Elmaghraby 2005; Koppius and van Heck 2003; Parkes and Kalagnanam 2005; Pinker et al. 2003; 
Snir and Hitt 2003).  We consider the following criteria and measures, with definitions as appropriate, in comparing 
auction outcomes under the three different feedback regimes: 
• Allocative efficiency.  The allocative efficiency of a mechanism measures the social welfare from the 
allocation using the mechanism as compared to the maximum social benefits that could have been 
achieved.  A 100% efficient procurement contract maximizes the joint gains, or welfare, of the buyer 
and the seller.  This metric is of interest to all parties, since a more efficient mechanism can potentially 
benefit both the suppliers as well as the buyer. 
• Buyer’s Utility.  This is the total utility of the buyer from the entire procurement.  This metric is of 
interest to the buyer.  In general, a mechanism that generates higher utility would be more preferable to 
the buyer. 
• Supplier’s Profit.  The profit garnered by each supplier who wins a contract is another common 
performance measure.  Bidders may be unwilling to participate in auctions where most of the gains of 
the trade go to the buyer.  One of the reasons suppliers initially resisted implementations of 
procurement auctions was because buyers tried to design mechanisms that squeezed prices down for 
the buyer at the expense of the suppliers (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2006; Jap 2002).  
Therefore, even though a buyer would want to maximize her utility, it may still be in her best interest 
to design a mechanism that leads to a fair distribution of the gains. 
• Auction Duration (or auction convergence). This is another metric of interest for auctioneers as longer 
auctions impose greater cost of running it.   
Experiments 
In order to study the impact of feedback on the dynamics and outcome of the auctions under varying levels of 
feedback, we conduct a laboratory experiment, wherein subjects participate in hypothetical multiattribute 
procurement auctions.  The hypothetical auction environment is based on the design presented earlier.  Each auction 
was conducted with four, five, or six suppliers.  Subjects played the role of suppliers, and a computer program, with 
a built-in utility function for evaluating bids and providing appropriate feedback, played the role of a buyer.   
The parameter values in our model were chosen as follows: A0 = 10, A1i = 100, B = 2.4, C = 1, D = 200*m where m 
is the number of suppliers in the auction, A2i = D - 200, α0 = 0.6, α1i = 2, α2i = 2, β = 0.3, γ = 1.05.  These values 
were selected so as to provide the utility and cost functions their desired characteristics, as discussed earlier, and 
also to set the Pareto optimal allocations at desired levels in order to accurately measure bidder performance.  The 
values of the threshold D and A2i were adjusted depending on the number of suppliers (as specified above) to 
maintain similar shapes of the utility and profit curves, and also to ensure that the Pareto optimal allocations are 
equivalent in each case for easy comparison.  The quality levels were translated to a 1 – 100 scale (rather than .01 
through 1.00) on the auction interface for easier interpretation by subjects.  In all subsequent discussions, we will 
use this revised quality scale. 
The supplier production functions in terms of cost, ci(q), and quantity, ni(q), are graphically represented in Figure 1.  
The quantity curve is shown for the auctions with five suppliers.  The downward-sloping quantity curve indicates 
that, as a supplier improves the quality of his product, he would be able to produce fewer units due to resource 
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constraints.  Note that, in order to minimize confounding our comparisons of auction mechanisms with different 
feedback levels, we chose to conduct the experiments with homogeneous suppliers, i.e., the production functions of 
all the suppliers participating in the auctions were identical. 
 
 
Figure 1. Production functions of suppliers. 
The auctions parameters were chosen in such a way that the maximum possible profit margin for the supplier at any 
quality level was 16.4%, beyond which buyer utility would be negative, i.e., the buyer could not pay a higher price 
for that quality level.  More precisely, the Pareto optimal profit was set at approximately $3,300, which could be 
earned if each supplier bid at the quality level of 100 and quantity level 200, with 16.4% profit margin.  This was 
Pareto optimal because no bidder could gain by deviating from these specifications without hurting another bidder’s 
earnings.  However, myopic profits for each supplier could be maximized at a quality level around 75.  The myopic 
profit maximizing allocation was deliberately set to be different from the Pareto optimal allocation to study whether 
feedback can lead to a Pareto optimal outcome.  The buyer’s utility curves and the suppliers’ profit curves for the 
auctions are shown in Figures 2a and 2b respectively.   
  
Figure 2a. Supplier’s profit function assuming 5% 
margin. 
Figure 2b. Buyer’s per-unit utility function assuming 
the supplier extracts 5% profit margin. 
The graphs are drawn assuming the supplier bids the maximum allowable quantity for a given quality and asks 5% 
margin from the trade.  The per-unit utility monotonically increases with quality.  The three curves in Figure 2b are 
overlapping. 
Experimental Sessions 
The three feedback levels described earlier form the three treatments for our laboratory experiments.  These are 
summarized in Table 1.  We conducted a total of 37 auctions over 10 experimental sessions. Three to four auctions 
were simultaneously conducted in each session.  The participants in a session were randomly assigned to specific 
auctions; so, bidders were not aware of the identities of the other bidders they were competing with. The 169 unique 
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participants in 37 auctions were all undergraduate business students who responded to volunteer solicitation 
announcements throughout the business school. The average age of the subject pool was 21 years; 53% were male.  
Subjects were not allowed to participate in these experiments more than once.  Thus, all our comparisons are 
between-subject. 
Table 1. Feedback schemes for supporting multiattribute auctions. 
Treatment Feedback Type Description 
Treatment 1 RANK  Rank feedback is provided. 
Treatment 2 UTILITY Rank, Price Update, and Quality Update are provided. 
Treatment 3 STATUS Rank, Price Update, Quality Update, and Status are provided. 
At the beginning of each session, instructions explaining the rules of the auction were read aloud. The instructions 
were followed by short tests to familiarize the participants with the rules of the auction as well as the bidding 
environment.  The auctions as well as the tests were entirely computerized. 
Auction Rules  
Each bidder could have at most one bid – called his best bid – accepted at any point during the auction.  This was the 
bid that generated the highest utility for the buyer.  Among all the bids placed by a supplier, the one that is most 
profitable for the buyer was identified to the buyer at all stages.  When an auction ended, only the standing best bids 
of each supplier were used for determining winners; all other bids were ignored. 
Each bidder could only see his own bids.  As is conventional in procurement auctions of high strategic importance, 
bidders were not shown the bids placed by other bidders. 
A soft stopping rule was used, i.e., after an initial time period, the auction ended if no bid that improved the buyer’s 
profit was placed for x minutes.  This rule of extending the auction was followed in order to eliminate sniping, i.e., 
placing bids in the last few seconds of the auction.  The initial time period was chosen as 14 minutes, with x = 1 
minute.  Consequently, each auction lasted at least 15 minutes.  The mean duration of the auctions was 19 minutes.   
The compensation scheme of the bidders was a fixed amount of $10 plus an amount based on their individual 
performances.  Bidders were paid in proportion to their profits from the auction.  If they were unable to win a 
contract, their profit was zero; in that case they only received the fixed amount of $10.  At the end of a session, 
participants were paid privately in sealed envelopes. 
Auction Interfaces 
The auction interface for all three treatments differed only in the type of feedback provided.  In all three treatments, 
only the bids that were placed by that particular bidder were displayed on his screen.  It is a common practice in 
procurement auctions to not disclose competitors’ bids.  The bids were displayed in reverse chronological order on 
the auction screen.  The total number of units required by the buyer and the number of suppliers competing in the 
auction to supply the units were disclosed as soon as the auction started. 
The interface for the Level 1 feedback is shown in Figure 3.  In this as well as in the other cases, the bidders could 
find their production costs by simply entering the quality level.  Furthermore, as soon as they entered the quality 
level, the maximum quantity that they could produce at their chosen quality level was also indicated to them.  This is 
shown in bold red at the top of the text-box for entering quantity in Figure 3.  In keeping with practical auctions, the 
bidders were not allowed to enter the asking price directly, instead they had to enter their intended profit margin, 
from which the asking price was automatically computed and displayed by the auction interface.  Once a bidder 
entered quality, margin, and quantity, the potential profit from the chosen specification was displayed to the bidder.  
Bids could be placed by entering a value for all the three enterable parameters, and then pressing the <Submit Bid> 
button.  The auction interface ensured that only valid values for the enterable parameters were submitted.  The 
standing best bid of the bidder was highlighted at all stages of the auction and the current rank was indicated at the 
center of the screen.  In Figure 3, Bid 10 is the current best bid and current rank of the bidder is 3 (out of 5 
participating suppliers).  The total elapsed time of the auction and the time since the last bid was placed were also 
displayed. 
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Figure 3. Auction interface for RANK feedback. 
In our second treatment, UTILITY feedback was provided.  This included Price Update, Quality Update along with 
Rank.  A snapshot of the interface for this treatment is shown in Figure 4.  In this example, since the rank of the 
bidder is 3, suggestions are provided for improving the rank to 2 and 1.  The suggestions imply that if the bidder 
wants to improve his rank to 2, he could reduce his asking price from $28.75 to $27.73 keeping the quality constant 
at 50; or he could increase the quality level of the bid from 50 to 51, keeping the asking price at $28.75.  For 
computing these suggestions, the quantity in each case was assumed to be the maximum allowed for the chosen 
quality.  The subjects were instructed that these were only approximate suggestions and they might need to update 
both quality as well as price in order to boost their rank. 
 
Figure 4. Auction interface for UTILITY feedback. 
In our third treatment, in addition to all the information described so far, the Status feedback was provided.  The 
interface for this treatment is shown in Figure 5.  The Status feedback is displayed below the rank.  In this example, 
the bidder is not currently in the winning set. 
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Figure 5. Auction interface for STATUS feedback. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics for several metrics of interest are provided in Table 2.  Although mean efficiency increases 
monotonically with increasing level of feedback, the differences in efficiency between each treatment are not 
statistically significant at the 95% level.  This insignificance is similar to the findings of Bichler (2000), who did not 
find any significant efficiency difference between price-only auctions and multiattribute auctions even after the 
buyer’s scoring function was revealed to the suppliers.  One way to increase the efficiency of the auctions would be 
for the buyer to provide feedback with information concerning how a supplier can improve his profit while also 
improving his rank.  In other words, overall social welfare can be increased by providing feedback that is directed to 
increase both buyer’s utility and supplier’s profit (Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005).  However, any feedback that assists the 
supplier to increase his profit would require the buyer to be familiar with suppliers’ profit functions.  Our feedback 
schemes, on the other hand, are designed to minimize the exchange of strategic information between the buyers and 
the sellers.   
The nature of feedback, however, has significant impact on the distribution of the economic surplus of the trade 
between the buyer and the suppliers.  Since there were varying number of suppliers in different auctions (ranging 
from four to six), we present the total utility of the buyer as a percentage of the maximum possible utility rather than 
presenting the total raw utility.  Buyer’s utility is higher in less transparent auctions while suppliers are able to 
extract higher profits with increasing transparency of the auctions.  The duration of the auctions vary with 
differences in feedback.  With STATUS feedback, the auctions complete faster than the other two cases, possibly 
because bidders are able to place bids with more precision.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the auctions. 
Treatment RANK feedback 
(Level 1) 
UTILITY feedback 
(Level 2) 
STATUS feedback 
(Level  3) 
Number of Auctions Conducted  
(number of participants) 
12 (60) 13 (58) 12 (51) 
Mean Efficiency (SE) 75.64% (2.12) 76.22% (2.70) 77.74% (2.07) 
Mean Buyer’s Utility as a Percentage of 
Maximum Possible Utility (SE) 
89.84% (1.71) 88.14% (3.38) 82.94% (4.21) 
Mean Supplier’s Profit (SE) $244.41 (38.92) $328.61 (123.68) $451.07 (124.58) 
Mean Duration in Minutes (SE) 19.12 (1.27) 19.54 (1.58) 17.43 (0.9) 
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Comparing the three levels of feedback, it appears that the marginal utility signal (Price update and Quality update), 
which was provided in Levels 2 and 3 but not in Level 1, helps the bidders in placing relatively more profitable bids.  
With UTILITY feedback, winning bidders, on average, extracted 34% more profit and with STATUS feedback 
almost 85% more profit than their counterparts in Treatment 1 with just RANK feedback (significant at the 95% 
level).   This indicates that higher transparency in the form of restrictive feedback aids bidders in generating higher 
surplus for themselves.  With price and quality updates, bidders can improve their ranks by revising their bids by the 
minimum required amounts, even without explicit information regarding the bids of the other bidders.  Thus, the 
utility signals serve the dual purpose of helping the bidders generate more profit for themselves while concealing the 
bids of the other suppliers. 
Neither the RANK nor the UTILITY feedback informs the bidder whether they are in the provisional winning set.  
Thus, in Levels 1 and 2, bidders who are not ranked one or two, may be tempted to try and improve their ranks even 
when they are in the winning set.  We provide data supporting this conjecture in the following section.  With the 
provision of the STATUS feedback (Level 3), however, bidders know whether they are winning at a certain rank.  
With the availability of this information, bidders are able to extract 37% more profits than those with UTILITY 
feedback.  However, the significantly higher profits in Level 3 come at the expense of buyer’s utility, which drops 
close to 6% compared to that in Level 2 (not significant at the 95% level).  In terms of the duration of the auctions, 
the most transparent auctions (with STATUS feedback) finish the fastest, most likely because the bidders have to 
place fewer exploratory bids. 
This evaluation of several categories of feedback provide a range of options for sourcing vendors (e.g., Ariba) and 
other companies, who want to automate their RFQ processes through multiattribute auctions, to choose from.  First 
and foremost, each of the feedback schemes assists bidders in bid formulation without explicitly revealing the 
buyer’s utility function to the suppliers or suppliers’ production schedules to the buyer.  Secondly, the empirical 
evaluation of the feedback schemes provides insights regarding the type of feedback to choose based on specific 
auction objectives.  For example, if the auction is for a commodity type product with a large number of suppliers, 
then the RANK feedback is a better choice for the buyer, since it can foster competition and drive down price.  
However, with this scheme, companies run the risk of alienating suppliers since bidders are unable to retain much 
profit for themselves.  The importance of long-term relationships in procurement is well established (Ganesan 1994; 
Monczka et al. 2005).  In that respect, the UTILITY or STATUS feedback may be the better choice since they 
generate relatively more profits for the suppliers.  In fact, the UTILITY feedback (Level 2) results in a win-win 
situation for the buyer and the supplier with only a negligible loss of efficiency (0.7%) compared to the STATUS 
feedback (Level 3). 
In addition to the above metrics, the number of suppliers to whom a buyer hands out a contract is also frequently of 
interest to buyers.  Procuring a commodity from a large number of suppliers is often less risky for a buyer than 
procuring it from only a few suppliers because in the first case the buyer has more alternatives.  In case a supplier is 
unable to fulfill the contract the buyer can turn to other suppliers.  Furthermore, procuring the commodity from a 
large number of suppliers puts the buyer in a stronger bargaining position.  For each level of feedback, we computed 
the percentage of suppliers who won a part of the contract; these were 85% with RANK, 88% for UTILITY, and 
94% with STATUS.  Thus, higher levels of transparency resulted in a greater number of winning suppliers.  
Moreover, 94% winning suppliers in Treatment 3 implies that STATUS feedback led the auctions close to Pareto 
optimal allocation. Recall, in our setup the Pareto optimal allocation was one where every participating supplier 
received a contract. 
An aspect of the procurement auctions that we did not investigate in this study is how some of the results presented 
above would change in repeated auctions.  Repeated interactions in multiround auctions have been shown to have 
impact on bidding dynamics leading to differences in the auction outcomes (Fevrier 2003; Jeitschko 1998; Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer 2000; Roth and Ockenfels 2006).  Bidders learn from their interactions with the mechanism 
and hence experienced bidders are able to make better use of the information feedback.  Future research can test 
whether efficiency of the auctions increase after repeated participation. 
Bidder Behavior 
In order to design effective economic mechanisms, it is important to understand the behavior of the agents 
participating in the mechanisms.  We look at several bid characteristics to study differences in bidding behavior 
among the three feedback regimes.  Table 3 displays descriptive statistics on the number of bids per bidder that were 
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placed in the auctions and also the number of provisional best bids.  Fewer total bids as well as fewer best bids were 
placed with increasing feedback.  The differences between levels 1 and 2 are not statistically significant.  The 
percentage of dead bids, i.e., bids that did not revise the existing best bid of the bidder, also decreased with higher 
levels of feedback (significant at the 99% level).  With more information, bidders appear to be better aware of the 
state of the auction resulting in more precise bidding.  However, even in Treatment 3 (the treatment with most 
amount of feedback), half the bids were inconsequential.  This supports the proposition that even the most advanced 
levels of feedback (that we tested) does not seem to disclose buyer’s and other bidders’ preferences to any supplier.   
Table 3. Bidding characteristics. 
 RANK feedback 
(Level 1) 
UTILITY feedback 
(Level 2) 
STATUS feedback 
(Level  3) 
Mean Number of Bids per Bidder (SE)8 55.10 (8.42) 44.62 (6.45) 30.31 (4.08) 
Mean Number of Best Bids per Bidder (SE) 19.28 (7.31) 18.74 (5.41) 15.15 (3.16) 
% of Dead Bids (i.e., bids that did not update 
the existing best bid of the bidder) 
65% 58% 50% 
Intrabidder dispersion and interbidder dispersion have been shown to be relevant metrics for characterizing bid 
patterns (Nyborg et al. 2002).  Intrabidder dispersion is a dispersion measure at the bidder level; given by the 
standard deviation of bidder i’s bids in auction j.  Interbidder dispersion is the auction level dispersion, i.e., the 
standard deviation of all the bids in an auction.  We measure these dispersions for both quality and profit margin for 
the best bids.  We do not measure the dispersion of the quantity, since in our setting the number of units the bidders 
could bid depended on his choice of quality.  Similarly, we do not measure price dispersion because, for a given 
profit margin, price would vary in concert with quality.  The results are shown in Table 4.   
It is evident that with UTILITY feedback, the means of the two types of dispersions along both the dimensions 
(quality and margin) are higher than the corresponding figures for RANK and STATUS feedbacks.   The likely 
reason is that, equipped with the marginal prices, bidders in Level 2 placed a large number of incremental bids.  
However, without the Status feedback, they possibly did not know when exactly to stop.  So, they possibly kept on 
bidding even after they were in the winning set.  Although the number of bids placed by each bidder in Treatment 1 
was 19% higher than those placed in Treatment 2, the bids in Treatment 1 auctions were likely in smaller 
increments; which is also the reason for the 7% higher dead bids in Treatment 1. 
Table 4. Bid dispersions of best bids. 
  
RANK feedback 
(Level 1) 
UTILITY feedback 
(Level 2) 
STATUS feedback 
(Level  3) 
Quality 12.65 14.60 9.75 Mean Intrabidder 
Dispersion Margin 3.78 7.21 4.41 
Quality 14.77 17.51 13.54 Mean Interbidder 
Dispersion Margin 5.92 11.38 6.72 
Comparing RANK feedback and STATUS feedback cases, we find that the quality dispersions are higher 
(significant at the 95% level) in the former while margin dispersions are higher in the latter (not significant at the 
95% level).  While for a given quality, a reduction in profit margin always was more profitable for the buyer, an 
increase in quality for a given profit margin did not necessarily increase buyer’s utility because the increase in 
quality implied an increase in cost, which for a given margin implied higher price and consequently less utility for 
the buyer.  Thus, with RANK feedback, the percentage of dead bids is relatively higher, as shown in Table 3.  The 
fact that the quality dispersions are higher with RANK feedback than STATUS feedback, while the margin 
dispersions are lower further emphasizes the hypothesis that bidders in Treatment 1 resorted to relatively more 
quality updates.  The dispersion patterns are very similar even if we include the dead bids. 
                                                           
8 Since the auctions were conducted with varying number of bidders, it is more informative to consider number of bids per bidder 
than the total number of bids per auction. 
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In summary, the results displayed in Table 4 in combination with those displayed in Table 3, indicate that the 
bidders in Treatment 1 placed a large number of bids with relatively larger quality variations while in Treatment 2, 
bidders effectively used the UTILITY feedback to place a large number of marginal bids.  With STATUS feedback, 
bidders placed fewer, more precise bids, manipulating both quality as well as the profit margin.  Thus, we find clear 
evidence that bidder behavior can be significantly influenced by the nature of feedback.  Furthermore, the 
differences in bidding patterns result in differences in economic outcomes.  Designers of mercantile mechanisms can 
exploit these insights to build mechanisms tailored to achieve specific auction objectives. 
So far, we have analyzed how the bidders revise their bids in each of the three feedback regimes.  Next, we analyze 
when the bidders choose to revise their bids.  First, we study whether the bidders updated their bids that were 
already winning (provisionally).  These results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Winning Bid revisions. 
 RANK feedback 
(Level 1) 
UTILITY feedback 
(Level 2) 
STATUS feedback 
(Level  3) 
Percentage of revised bids that were 
already provisionally winning 
55% 61% 49% 
Percentage of winning bid revisions 
that did not improve supplier’s profit  
45% 47% 23% 
As can be seen, in the two cases where we did not provide the winning status feedback, more than half the bids 
revised were already winning; 55% in Level 1 and 61% in Level 2.  Some of the winning bids were, of course, 
revised to place more profitable bids; which is why we see that even with the availability of winning status 
feedback, bidders revised their existing winning bids.  However, in the two cases where winning status was not 
displayed to the bidders (Level 1 and Level 2), a large percentage of the winning bid revisions (45% with RANK 
and 47% with UTILITY) lowered the supplier’s profit.  These bids were most likely placed by the bidders to 
improve their ranks.  In fact, the majority of these bids (65% with RANK and 63% with UTILITY) were placed by 
bidders who were in ranks 3 or below.   
But what is even more interesting is that even with STATUS feedback, we find that 23% of the winning bid 
revisions were unprofitable for the bidders.  This observation is contrary to theoretical predictions of bidder 
behavior, and underscores the importance of conducting laboratory experiments to study bidder behavior.  The most 
likely reason for this departure from theory is that, apart from winning, bidders wanted to achieve higher ranks.  It is 
also possible, that some bidders preferred placing jump bids (akin to Evaluators in price-only auctions – Bapna et al. 
2000) rather than marginal bids.  However, the percentage of unprofitable winning bid revisions in Treatment 3 is 
significantly less than in the other two cases.  This emphasizes the significance of the STATUS feedback, without 
which the bidders are not sure whether they are winning, and consequently they try to undercut their profit margins 
in hopes of securing a contract.  With the provision of Status feedback, we see a higher number of winners in 
Treatment 3 compared to the other two cases.  As mentioned earlier, in our setup, the Pareto optimal outcome could 
be achieved when each bidder bid for quality 100, and each proposed to supply equal number of units, i.e., the total 
quantity required by the buyer divided by the number of suppliers.  In order to reach the Pareto optimal allocation, 
some bidders needed to settle at lower ranks without undercutting their profits in striving to achieve higher ranks.   
However, without knowledge of the winning status at a lower rank, the bidders sacrificed profit in order to ensure 
that they end up in the winning set.  Based on these observations, we can postulate that, to achieve Pareto optimal 
outcomes, it is important to disclose provisional allocation information. 
Conclusions 
Procurement auctions are increasingly becoming a popular sourcing mechanism for firms.  Traditional reverse 
auctions hinder the automation of procurement contracts, which typically have several non-monetary attributes in 
addition to price.  Multiattribute auctions provide a promising extension to the standard auction framework.  Theory, 
practice, and experimental evidence suggest that these auctions, through the use of more expressive bids, can 
improve the efficiency of procurement for configurable goods and services compared to price-only auctions.  
However, given the strategic nature of these auctions, the type and amount of information that should be exchanged 
is not readily apparent, although the transparency of the mechanism has serious profit implications for the buyers as 
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well as the suppliers.  From an economic perspective, the challenge is the analysis and derivation of appropriate 
feedback mechanisms that enable us to achieve specific auction objectives.   
In this paper, we extend prior research by designing several feedback schemes for multiattribute auctions with 
multiple sourcing.  An important characteristic of these schemes is that they do not reveal buyer’s utility function to 
the suppliers nor are the suppliers required to disclose their production schedule to the buyer.  We also analyze the 
economic and behavioral implications of different types of feedback using a laboratory experiment with over 150 
subjects.  Our research contribution is threefold: (1) developing decision support capabilities that can be used by 
procuring companies and sourcing vendors for running multiattribute procurement auctions, (2) evaluating the 
decision support schemes using the test bed approach of experimental economics, and (3) understanding the 
behavior of participants in complex auction environments.  The results from our experiments provide us valuable 
insights on how the nature of feedback influences bidder behavior and the distribution of economic surplus among 
the buyers and sellers.   
Our results show that, in the case of multiple sourcing procurement auctions, it is possible to conduct efficient 
auctions without exchanging strategic information between the buyer and the sellers.  Unlike in the auction of a 
single item, where higher transparency leads to higher competition and consequently lower supplier profits, in a 
multiunit auction, with appropriate feedback, both the buyer as well as the sellers are able to extract a share of the 
gains.  With just the rank feedback, the sellers are unable to compose smart bids leaving considerable amount of 
surplus on the table. 
While buyers may be tempted to implement a procurement mechanism that is solely aimed at cost reduction, buyer-
supplier relationship may be strained if the suppliers are squeezed out of their profits.  In the long run, it is difficult 
to sustain an economic mechanism where only one party reaps the entire economic surplus.  Thus, in the interest of 
designing sustainable and fair mechanisms, buyers may need to make the environment sufficiently transparent.  
However, given that procurement is a key source of strategic advantage for many organizations, it is unrealistic to 
assume that buyers will be willing to disclose their complete preference information to suppliers.  Organizations 
such as Ariba choose a specific information disclosure scheme ranging from high transparency to high opacity 
depending on the type of the product and the structure of the market.  Keeping these practical concerns in mind, we 
test several feedback schemes and, based on our empirical analysis, provide recommendations regarding the scope 
of their usage.  Future research can test the robustness of these results using different market structures.  The results 
can also be tested in a repeated setting, i.e., a setting where subjects participate in the same treatment multiple times. 
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